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EMERGING TRENDS FOR PRODUCTS
LIABILITY: MARKET SHARE LIABILITY,
ITS HISTORY AND FUTURE
Frank J. Giliberti*
INTRMODUCTIONW
Traditionally, product liability actions require that the plaintiff
identify a particular defendant as the manufacturer, distributor or
seller of a product and also prove that the defendant's product
caused the plaintiff's injury. In the absence of evidence
identifying a specific defendant to the particular product in issue,
the traditional products liability action is subject to dismissal for
failure to set forth a prima facie claim.' In product cases
involving drugs, which often are fungible products, this may be
an insurmountable hurdle since it is very difficult, or even
impossible for a plaintiff to prove that a particular manufacturer's
product caused his or her injury.
Courts have developed different legal theories to help plaintiffs
state causes of action where the defendant cannot be readily
identified. Historically, these theories included concert of action,
alternative liability and enterprise liability. These three theories
enable a plaintiff to state a cause of action even though they
cannot specify which, of perhaps several defendants, caused the
actual harm, but is at least able to positively identify all the
tortfeasors potentially responsible. Thus, these theories enable a
plaintiff to state all of the elements of a traditional product
liability cause of action: (i) identity of the defendant; (ii) injury to
* The author is currently a partner at the law firm of Rivkin, Radler &
Kremer.
M The author wishes to acknowledge the research contributions of Erin A.
Sidaras and Bella Blat, summer legal interns at Rivkin, Radler & Kremer.
'Hymowitz v. Ei Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 504, 539 N.E.2d 1069,
1073, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 945 (1989). "In a products liability action.
identification of the exact defendant whose product injured the plaintiff is, of
course, generally required." Id.
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person/property; (iii) caused by a defective product manufactured
by the defendant.2
The most recent development is in the area of market share
liability, which permits a products liability cause of action to be
stated where the plaintiff cannot identify either one or a small
group of defendants potentially responsible for the harm and
cannot join all or substantially all of the defendants in the action.
Market share liability grew out of the particular problems of
identifying manufacturers of a drug developed in the late 1930s,
namely Diethylstilbestrol, commonly known as DES. DES is a
synthetic estrogen that was created in England and ultimately
marketed in the United States from the late 1940s until
approximately 1971 as an anti-miscarriage drug. It was
administered to pregnant women with a history of miscarriage or
threatened miscarriage. In the 1970s, claims arose that the drug
crossed the placenta of the in utero child, causing various medical
problems including uterine cancer, infertility and pregnancy
outcome problems as adults or adolescents. In 1971, the FDA
banned the use of DES as a miscarriage preventative.
The hurdle that early DES plaintiffs faced, and still face in
many cases, concerns the inability to identify the particular
manufacturer of the DES that the mother allegedly ingested. This
problem arose for many reasons, very often because the drug was
fungible and often marketed generically, compounded by the fact
that it was usually dispensed by pharmacies, in pharmacy
containers, without product information. Additionally, due to the
passage of time, many DES mothers simply do not recall much,
if anything, about the name or other identifying characteristics of
the DES they ingested.
Market share liability is the most progressive theory towards
assisting plaintiffs because it completely eliminates the basic
requirement of identifying a specific defendant or group of
defendants as the manufacturer of the actual pill or tablet
ingested. For this reason it is also one of the most controversial
theories and has been limited in its application. In Hymowitz v.
2 Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 141 Misc. 2d 194, 200, 533 N.Y.S.2d 224, 228
(Sup. Ct. Chenango County 1988).
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Eli Lilly and Company,3 the New York Court of Appeals adopted
market share liability theory in DES cases for New York
plaintiffs whose claims arose in New York. However, many
states still refuse to adopt market share liability, even in DES
cases, perhaps in view of the mass litigation it has created in the
states that have adopted it such as New York.
Set forth below is a discussion of market share liability as
applied in New York, how it differs from other alternative tort
theories, and an overview of its application to other products
liability actions.
PREcURSoRS To MARKEr SHARE LIABiLrry
A. Alternative Liability
Alternative liability was first applied in Summers v. Tice,5 the
famous hunting accident case. When two or more defendants act
in a tortious manner, but only one of the defendants actually
injures the plaintiff; and the defendants are in a better position of
knowledge as to the facts, alternative liability shifts the burden of
proof, requiring that each defendant prove that his own tortious
conduct was not the cause of the plaintiff's injuries. This burden
shifting provides each defendant with an incentive to exculpate
himself at the expense of the remaining defendant. It also
provides the plaintiff with a device to combat silence between the
defendants, which could preclude the plaintiff from identifying
the tortious party. Alternative liability also requires a small
number of defendants; that evidence exists that at least one of
3 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1989).
4 The issue of whether market share liability applies turns on the question of
the State of exposure. If the claim arose in a State that has not adopted market
share liability, the case is subject to dismissal unless identification is made. See
Braune v. Abbott Laboratories, 895 F. Supp. 530 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (Market
share liability is not recognized under Georgia law) and numerous other cases
decided by Justice Ira Gammerman in N.Y. County Supreme Court.
: 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
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defendants joined has actually caused the injury, and that all-
possible defendants are joined.6
B. Concert of Action
The concert of action theory has been applied in situations
where defendants engage in a common plan or scheme in an
effort to commit a tortious act. Historically, it was applied in
drag racing cases, but is now commonly alleged in toxic tort
cases involving multiple defendants. Concerted action liability
requires an agreement, tacit or otherwise, to conceal product
risks despite the defendants' knowledge that the product is
dangerous.' Mere parallel activity, such as conduct in developing
and marketing a particular product, is insufficient to impose
liability. The defendants must take affirmative steps, in a joint
effort, to conceal the product's dangers. Implicit is the fact that
all of the defendants are alleged to be tortfeasors who caused the
actual harm to the plaintiff.8
C. Enterprise Liability
Enterprise liability is similar to concerted action liability except
it imposes liability on an entire industry. Such liability, however,
is deemed inappropriate where the industry is large in size.'
Again, all of the defendants are before the court and each is
alleged to be an actual tortfeasor causing the damage. In general,
6 See New York Telephone Co. v. AAER Sprayed Insulations, 173 Misc. 2d
602, 607, 661 N.Y.S.2d 701, 705 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1997)
(discussing requirements of alternative liability theory); 210 East 86th Street
Corp. v. Combustion Eng., Inc., 821 F. Supp. 125, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
7 City of New York v. Lead Industries Ass'n, Inc., 190 A.D.2d 173, 597
N.Y.S.2d 698 (1st Dep't 1993).
8 Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 506, 539 N.E.2d at 1074, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 946.
9 Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353, 378
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) Enterprise liability cause of action stated where industry was
made up of only six defendants and facts demonstrated that the defendants, as
a group, through their trade association, committed tortious acts with respect
to design and labeling of blasting caps.
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enterprise liability is not widely applied due to the specific factual
allegations required.
MARKET SHARE LIBILrrY
Market share liability was endorsed by the New York Court of
Appeals in Hyinowitz v. Eli Lilly & Company,10 which involved
appeals on motions to dismiss DES claims for failure to identify
the specific manufacturer of the DES ingested by the plaintiffs'
mother. The text of the decision clearly states that market share
liability was adopted to permit cases to proceed that could not
otherwise survive under a traditional products liability theory or
because other more traditional alternate theories, including
alternative liability and concert of action, also did not permit DES
plaintiffs to state a cause of action.
The Court noted that plaintiffs in DES cases have particular
difficulty identifying the manufacturers of the DES alleged to
have been ingested as a direct result of the marketing strategies
allegedly engaged in by the manufacturers. Many times the drug
itself was not labeled or was dispensed generically by
pharmacists, making it virtually impossible to determine the
manufacturer." The court noted:
All DES was of identical chemical composition. Druggists
usually filled prescriptions from whatever was on hand.
Approximately 300 manufacturers produced the drug with
companies entering and leaving the market continuously
during the 24 years that DES was sold for pregnancy use.
The long latency period of a DES injury compounds the
identification problem; memories fade, records are lost or
destroyed, and witnesses die. Thus, the pregnant women
who took DES generally never knew who produced the
drug they took, and there was no reason to attempt to
10 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1989).
" Id. at 504-14, 539 N.E.2d at 1073-1079, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 945-50.
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discover this fact until many years after ingestion, at which
time the information is not available. 12
In adopting market share liability, 13 the court first rejected
alternative liability and distinguished the famous case of Summers
v. Tice.14 As noted above, Summers endorsed burden shifting to
the defendants to exonerate themselves when all possible
tortfeasors are before the court, where their numbers are small,
and when they are in a better position to explain how the injury
occurred. The Court of Appeals also rejected concert of action as
inapplicable to DES, noting its application in drag racing cases,
where all defendants have an understanding, express or tacit, to
participate in a common plan or design to commit a tortious act. 15
In DES cases, by contrast, it was not possible to have all of the
tortfeasors before the court because the industry was too large
and many of the manufacturers were no longer in existence.
Additionally, due to the passage of time, lack of records, and
marketing practices, the defendants were in no better position to
have knowledge of the actual manufacturer than the plaintiff.
Moreover, no common plan or scheme existed and only evidence
of parallel activity amongst the manufacturers was shown. The
court noted: "In short, extant common law doctrines,
unmodified, provide no relief for the DES plaintiff unable to
identify the manufacturers of the drug that impaired her."' 6 The
court further noted that "DES . . . is a singular case." 7
In adopting market share liability, the Court examined various
approaches employed by other states and adopted a national
12 Id. at 503, 539 N.E.2d at 1072, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 944.
'3 Other states had already adopted market share (California, Washington)
and others rejected it (Missouri, Iowa). This issue reared itself most recently
in Ohio in 1998, where the Ohio Supreme Court rejected it, thus possibly
shutting down hundreds of DES cases there. Sutowski v. Eli Lilly & Co., 696
N.E.2d 187 (1998).
14 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
"5 Id. at 3; see State v. Newberg, 278 P. 568 (Or. 1929).
16 Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 507, 539 N.E.2d 1069,
1075, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 947 (1989).
'7 Id. at 508, 539 N.E.2d at 1075, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 947.
724 [Vol 15
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market theory based upon the model used in Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories8 The reason for using a national market was to
"apportion liability so as to correspond to the overall culpability
of each defendant, measured by the amount of risk of injury each
defendant created to the public-at-large." 9 Indeed, use of a non-
national market was deemed unreliable.'
Exculpation is based solely upon proof that a manufacturer did
not participate in the marketing of DES for pregnancy use - no
exculpation is permitted by proof that the pill manufactured by a
particular defendant did not resemble the one described by the
plaintiff. The Court's decision to limit exculpation required the
balancing of the equities, thus making liability several and
limiting the recovery against each defendant to the actual
percentage of the market that each named manufacturer
possessed.21 This often results in less than 100% recovery for
plaintiffs because, as a practical matter, the entire market can
never be joined in the case.'
APPLICABILITY OF MARKET SHARE
LIABiLITY To OTHER PRODUCT LIABILrrY CASES
Even though the Hymowitz Court stated that the "DES situation
is a singular case with manufacturers acting in a parallel manner
to produce an identical, generically marketed product, which
causes injury many years later,"" plaintiffs in New York have
argued that market share liability should be extended to embrace
other products liability cases, including asbestos, handguns,
silicone breast implants and lead paint. 3 All attempts to extend
the doctrine in New York to products other than DES, however,
have failed or met with inconclusive results.
18 607 P.2d 924 (1980).
19 Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 512, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
2 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 508, 539 N.E.2d at 1075, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 947.
23 Id. at 507, 539 N.E.2d at 1075, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 947.
1999 725
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A. ASBESTOS
Attempts to extend market share liability to asbestos cases have
generally failed to date, with the cases citing great differences in
the qualities of asbestos and DES. In 210 East 86th Street Corp.
v. Combustion Engineering, Incorporated,24 for example, the
court specifically rejected market share theory in asbestos
litigation. In so deciding, the court cited numerous cases from
other jurisdictions, focusing on the fact that asbestos was not a
fungible product in the same sense as DES. It was also noted that
while all DES had identical physical properties and chemical
compositions, asbestos products had wide variations in toxicities,
composition and harmful effect.' The court also discussed the
fact that since asbestos products had varied uses, forms and
functions it was difficult to define a market for the products,
unlike DES.26
A case of interest is New York Telephone Co. v. AAER Sprayed
Insulations,27 where market share liability was alleged against a
number of asbestos product manufacturers, but the claim was
precluded for failure to make appropriate disclosure during
discovery. Thus, the ultimate merits of the market share liability
claim, both factually and legally, may never be determined.
However, in discussing the claim, the court stated: "A successful
market share claim would impose liability proportional to the
market share which each defendant's productions of a particular
type occupied relative to the New York market for such product
at the time of sale and installation in plaintiff's buildings." 28
It is interesting to note, however, that notwithstanding the fact
that the application of market share theory of liability is doubtful
in New York, the theory was adopted as a method of
apportionment for settlement in the case of In re Joint Eastern
and Southern Districts Asbestos Litigation.29 In an earlier
24 821 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
5Id. at 146.
26 Id.
27 173 Misc. 2d 602, 661 N.Y.S.2d 701 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1997).
Id. at 605 n.3, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 704 n.3.
29 878 F. Supp. 473 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1995).
726 [Vol 15
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decision in this case,30 the court considered post-verdict motions
which claimed that the court had effectively charged the jury in a
manner that encouraged consideration of market share liability.
The court rejected the motion, indicating the evidence linked
particular defendants to particular sites, and that the product was
not fungible.31
In contrast, market share theory was permitted in a California
case upon a finding that the particular asbestos product, brake
pads, met the fungibility test. In Wheeler v. Raybestos-
Manhattan,32 workers who had been exposed to asbestos fibers in
their work with brake pads filed a products liability action. The
court held that brake pads were sufficiently fungible to permit
workers to attempt to prove a market share theory of liability.33
Further, the workers' ability to identify one or more
manufacturers of brake pads with which they had come in contact
during the course of their work did not prevent the assertion of
market share liability.34 The court explained that "while brake
pads are absolutely interchangeable [ ] [with] one another ..
they contain[ed] roughly comparable quantities of the single
asbestos fiber chrysotile., 35
B. HANDGUNS
One of the more creative and novel products liability cases to
arise in recent years is Hamilton v. Accu-Tek,36 which was a case
brought by the representatives of individuals who were shot and
killed by illegally obtained handguns. The suit alleges negligent
marketing of handguns that fostered growth of the underground
handgun market, design defect, and fraud on federal officers with
respect to regulation of the product. In denying summary
judgment to the defendants, the court suggested that liability
30 798 F. Supp. 925 (1992).
31 Id. at 935.
32 8 Cal. App. 4th 1152, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 109 (1992).
33 Id. at 1156, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 111.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 935 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
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might ultimately rest on a type of market share liability. Senior
District Judge Weinstein stated the following:
If the underlying cause of the injuries is the unchecked
growth of the underground handgun market, and not an
individual negligent sale of a particular gun by a particular
defendant to a particular licensed dealer, then the New
York Court of Appeals might find a market share theory or
some variant to be viable even if the manufacturer of the
gun used to commit the killing were known.37
The New York Court of Appeals well might, for policy
reasons, adopt a Hymowitz-type theory, or one of the theories
espoused by other state courts such as those in Sindell or Shackil
that would allow for exculpation or adjustments for risk
contribution at variance with actual market share.38
If negligence lies not in the creation and fostering of the
underground gun market, but in the individual sale of a handgun,
market share liability might still be a viable theory where the
defendant is unknown. It is the nature of illegal handgun use that
the shooter is likely to dispose of the gun so as to minimize the
chances of being caught. Depending upon what is available to
law enforcement investigators where the gun is not retrieved, it
will be possible only in some instances, and then to varying
degrees, to narrow the field of possible handgun manufacturers.
On much different facts and for different reasons than those in the
DES cases, difficulties in defendant identification unique to the
product and to manufacturer may arise. The New York Court of
Appeals might choose to adopt, for reasons of public policy, a
7 Id. at 1331.
38 See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541
N.Y.S.2d 941, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989) (no exculpation); Shackil v.
Lederle Lab., 530 A.2d 1287 (N.J. App. Div. 1987), rev'd, 561 A.2d 511
(1989) (modification for risk contribution); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607
P.2d 924, 931 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (allowing
exculpation).
[Vol 15
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theory of collective liability. Most appropriate might be a form
of market share liability that provided for exculpation. 39
In opining that concerted activity or enterprise liability would
not apply, the court said:
It does not appear that the New York Court of Appeals
would make use of either concerted activity or enterprise
liability theories. The former, as Hymowitz makes clear,
requires evidence of a tacit agreement as to the tortious
conduct. Plaintiffs have not produced any facts suggesting
the existence of an agreement among the defendants as to
how to market the guns. The latter theory requires joint
control of the risk through use of a trade association or
some other method of standard setting. Plaintiffs allege
joint coordination of policy positions but that relates to
lobbying activities, not to actual marketing. Given the facts
as thus far developed, the theories the New York Court of
Appeals would most likely adopt, if it were to adopt any,
are some form of either market share or alternativeliability .4
C. BREAST IMPLANTS
New York courts have declined to apply market share liability
to breast implant cases. For instance, in Matter of New York
State Silicone Breast Implant Litigation,4 market share liability
was rejected, as was a claim of concert of action (on the facts
alleged). The Court stated as to market share:
This Court finds that market share liability should not be
applied to breast implants because such products are not
fungible and the manufacturers of the implants can often be
identified. There are differences in the design and
composition of the implants; the warning inserts in each of
39 Hamilton, 935 F. Supp. at 1331.
4 Id.
4 166 Misc. 2d 85, 631 N.Y.S.2d 491 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1995).
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the products vary; and the products are not generically
marketed. Most importantly, the majority of women
involved in the breast implant litigation have been able to
identify all or some of the manufacturers of their implants.
This ability to identify most of the manufacturers is
important since both market share and concert of action
liability theories came into play so plaintiffs could have
recourse to the courts where product identification was
impossible. The rationale of the Court of Appeals decision
in Hymowitz was that market share liability was necessary
because the DES was an identical generically marketed
product, as a result of which the manufacturers of the
product could not be identified.
In the present case, silicone breast implant
manufacturers make identifiable products, marketed under
specific manufacturer names. The reality of a plaintiff's
plight when product identification cannot be made is like
any other plaintiff who claims injury from a product that
has been lost or destroyed. So drastic a departure from
traditional tort law is not warranted here. Based on the
foregoing, this court holds that plaintiffs' claim for market
share liability is dismissed.42
D. LEAD PAINT
The applicability of market share liability to lead paint
poisoning cases has also been generally unsuccessful. No New
York cases have been reported to our knowledge where the issue
has arisen. In City of New York v. Lead Industries Associations
Inc.,4 it does not appear that market share liability was raised,
but manufacturers of lead paint were subject to concerted action
liability because:
[the] manufacturing defendants allegedly coordinated their
efforts to conceal the hazard, to mislead the public and the
42 Id. at 89, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
43 190 A.D.2d 173, 597 N.Y.S.2d 698 (1st Dep't 1993).
[Vol 15730
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government as to the hazard, and to market and promote
the use of the product despite their knowledge of the
hazard .... The manufacturing defendants accomplished
this plan by allegedly having it propounded by their trade
association, defendant Lead Industries Association. Each of
the manufacturers, thus became a principal, chargeable with
the knowledge and conduct of its agent."
Pennsylvania courts have rejected market share theory in lead
paint litigation. In Skipworth v. Lead Industries Association,
Incorporated,45 parents of a minor who was allegedly injured due
to ingestion of lead paint in the home, which had been built
around 1870, brought a personal injury action against
manufacturers of lead pigment or their alleged successors. The
court held that the doctrines of market share liability and
alternative liability were inapplicable and plaintiff could not
recover under civil conspiracy or concert of action theories. ' , As
to market share liability, the court compared lead paint to DES
and found it inapplicable because (i) the relevant time period in
question was far more extensive than with DES and (ii) no
specific application(s) of lead paint could be identified as having
caused the alleged injury, leaving an almost 100 year period in
issue, which (iii) assured that many of the defendants most likely
had no liability in fact. 47 Finally, lead paint was found not to be a
fungible product. 48 In Ohio, however, market share liability was
approved in Jackson v. Glidden Company.49 This decision,
however, is clearly not good law in light of the Ohio Supreme
Court's recent rejection of market share liability in DES in
Sutowski.50
44Id. at 178, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
45 690 A.2d 169 (1997).
46 Id. at 173.
4 Id. at 172.
48 id.
49 647 N.E.2d 879 (1995).
50 696 N.E.2d 187 (1998).
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E. TOBACCO
No market share liability would appear appropriate or
necessary in tobacco cases, since most persons are aware of the
brand of cigarette that they have smoked. In DaSilva v.
American Tobacco Company, 1 the complaint alleged that each of
the plaintiff smokers purchased and smoked cigarettes, became
addicted to the product, and have been afflicted with cancer as a
result of their cigarette habit. The court held that even though
plaintiffs alleged a concerted action claim against defendant, they
are required to identify the brands of cigarettes they smoked, thus
enabling the manufacturer to respond. Similarly Cresser v.
American Tobacco Company52 found a complaint deficient for
failure to specify brands smoked.
The court held a concerted action theory viable in Sackman v.
Liggett Group, Incorporated." In Sackman, a smoker who
suffered from lung cancer brought a products liability action
against a cigarette manufacturer. The court ruled that allegations
that a cigarette manufacturer had, as member of the tobacco
industry, been in possession of scientific and medical evidence
regarding the dangers of smoking cigarettes, and that despite the
knowledge, the manufacturer had, along with other
manufacturers, conspired to repress information and misrepresent
health risks at issue, were sufficient to state claim under
concerted action theory. 4
F. LATEX GLOVES
In the case of Boggs v. Allegiance Corporation,55 a New York
plaintiff asserted market share and enterprise liability against
latex glove manufacturers. No disposition or status is available to
report at this time.
"' 175 Misc. 2d 424, 667 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1997).
51 174 Misc. 2d 1, 662 N.Y.S.2d 374 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1997).
" 965 F. Supp. 391 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
54 Id. at 396.
51 97-4276 (S.D.N.Y.), as reported in Mealey's Litig. Rep. Latex (June
1997).
[Vol 15732
14
Touro Law Review, Vol. 15 [1999], No. 2, Art. 18
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss2/18
MARKET SHARE LIABILITY
G. TAINTED BLOOD PRODUCTS
Market share liability has been adopted for litigation involving
tainted blood products, which are alleged to have been a source
of HIV infections. Doe v. Cutter Biological, Incorporated,5 6 and
Smith v. Cutter Biological, Incorporated. 57
CONCLUSION
Market share liability to date has been a dramatic departure
from traditional tort liability theories for product liability actions.
While its application has been limited to DES for the most part,
creative lawyers and judges will undoubtedly pursue new
applications and modifications to its "traditional" Hymowitz
elements.
56 971 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1992).
1823 P.2d 717 (Haw. 1991).
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